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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
A National Association,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
No.

18308

M-K INVESTMENT COMPANY,
J. 0. KINGSTON, FRANK A.
NELSON, JR., PAUL W. NELSON,
and WILLIAM D. MAXWELL,
Defendants and
Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 26, 1979, the defendant, M-K Investment Company
executed a Promissory Note in favor of the plaintiff, Zions
First National Bank,

for the sum of $150,000.00, together

with interest thereon from March 26, 1979, at the annual percentage rate of 2.5% above the prime rate of Zions First National
Bank.

To secure payment of the Promissory Note,

the plaintiff

took an "Assignment of Monies" from M-K Investment Company and
also required and received Continuing Guarantees of Credit from
the defendants, J.
Nielson,

0. Kingston,

Frank A. Nelson, Jr., Paul W.

and William D. Maxwell, whereby each individual uncondi-

tionally guaranteed prompt payment of the Promissory Note.
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M-K Investment Company failed to pay the Promissory Note
according to its terms and the plaintiff brought its action
against M-K Investment Company and the four guarantors.
the defendants filed Answers and Cross-claims.

All of

Subsequently, a

petition in Bankruptcy was filed in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Utah, naming M-K Investment Company
as the debtor,

thus staying further action against M-K Invest-

ment Company.
In his Answer to the Complaint, J. 0. Kingston admitted
there was an unpaid obligation and further admitted his written
guarantee of that obligation.
Paul W. Nielsen,

Similarily, Frank A. Nelson, Jr.,

and William D. Maxwell, in their responses to

the plaintiff's Requests for Admissions, each admitted that there
was an unpaid obligation owing to the plaintiff and,

also admitted,

in their Answers to the Complaint that they each executed
guarantees for that obligation.

Only the amount of the unpaid

obligation was contested by the guarantors.

That issue was

resolved at a hearing held before the Court on March 31, 1982,
and is not an issue on this appeal.
In their Answers to the Complaint,
Nielson and William D. Maxwell, raise,
defenses,
(1)

the defendants, Paul W.
as their only affirmative

the following:
That the plaintiff breached an alleged promise and

representation to take adequate and full security by either
waiving such security or by failing to obtain adequate and full
security in the first place;
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(2)

That the plaintiff, having adequate and full security,

refused to either foreclose its lien on that security or assign
the security to the individual guarantors so that they could
foreclose the lien;
(3)

That the plaintiff received payment of the obligation;

(4)

That the plaintiff released and discharged one or more

and,

of the other named defendants without reserving its rights
against the defendants,

Paul W.

Nielson and William D. Maxwell,

thereby releasing them also.
On December 7, 1981, after completing discovery,
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.

the plaintiff

All of the parties filed

memoranda and affidavits either supporting or opposing the Motion
for Summary Judgment.

The matter was heard before the Court on

January 5, 1982, and, on February 5, 1982, the Court entered a
Partial Summary Judgment holding each of the individual guarantors
liable to the plaintiff but refusing to fix the amount of that
liability because the plaintiff had not adequately established
the amount of the obligation.
On March 12, 1982,
Summary Judgment for
the liability.
1982, and,

the plaintiff filed a second Motion for

the purpose of establishing the amount of

This matter was heard before the Court on March 31,

on April 1, 1982,

the Court entered a Summary Judg-

ment in favor of the plaintiff for the principal amount of $150,000.Q(
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plus $77,977.28 interest through January 5, 1982 and interest
thereafter at the annual percentage rate of 2.50% above the
prime interest rate at Zions First National Bank, together with
$2,500.00 attorney's fees and $84.25 costs.
The defendants, Paul W. Nielson and William D. Maxwell have
appealed to this Court, seeking a reversal of the Partial
Summary Judgment of liability entered by the District Court on
February 5, 1982.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Essentially,

the appellants have raised two questions on

appeal.
QUESTION NO. 1:

Are there any unresolved issues of fact

that were material to the District Court's decision granting
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff?
QUESTION NO. 2:

Did the District Court err with respect

to any of its conclusions of law?

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE
AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT
The defendants, Paul W.

Nielson and William D. Maxwell,

allege in their brief that the Partial Summary Judgment was
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improper due to disputed material issues of fact.

They speci-

fically point to four purported material issues of fact,

First,

whether the plaintiff was to take, as security for the Promissory
Note in question, an assignment from M-K Investment Company of
a real property mortgage.

It should be noted at the outset that

this issue was not raised in the pleadings and was,
not properly before the District Court.

therefore,

The District Court would

have erred if it had denied the plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment because of a purported material issue of fact that was
not properly before the Court.
Furthermore, even if the issue of the plaintiff taking an
assignment of the real property mortgage had been properly
raised as a defense,

the parol evidence rule would prevent the

defendants from proving an oral agreement by the plaintiff to
take such an assignment as additional collateral.

The plaintiff

specifically denies representing that it would take an assignment of a real property mortgage.
had been made,

Even if such a representation

in order for the defendants to have relied upon it

as a basis for executing the written guarantees,

the representa-

tion must have been made prior to or contemporaneous with the
execution of the written guarantees.
unambiguous.

The written guarantees are

They make no mention of being conditioned on the

plaintiff's taking an assignment of a real property mortgage.
For the defendants to admit on one hand that they executed written
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guarantees that are clearly unconditional, promising prompt
payment of the indebtedness of M-K Investment Company to the
plaintiff, and then to allege,

on the other hand,

that they

executed the written guarantees only on the condition that the
plaintiff would take an assignment of a real property mortgage,
is a blatant contraction.
Under the parol evidence rule, Utah Code Annotated §78-25-16,
(P)arole evidence may not be given to change
the terms of a written agreement which are
clear, definite and unambiguous.
To permit
that would be to cast doubt upon the integrity of all contracts and to leave a party
to a solemn agreement at the mercy of the
uncertainties of oral testimony given by
one who, in the subsequent light of events,
discovers that he made a bad bargain. E.A.
Strout Western Reality Agency, Inc. v.
Broderick, 522 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1974)
Utah had long recognized that absent fraud, mistake or
ambiguity,

the parol evidence rule bars the admission of evidence

of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements which are in conflict
and at varience with a written instrument.

See i.e. Security

Leasing Company v. Flinco, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 242, 461 P.2d 460
(1969); Starley v.

Deseret Foods Corporation,

1938); and McCormick v.

Levy,

74 P.2d 1221 (Utah,

37 Utah 134, 106 P. 660

(1910).

As stated above, the Continuing Guarantees of Credit are
clear and unambiguous.

Furthermore, no mistake or fraud has been

alleged by any of the defendants.

Under the parol evidence rule,

any evidence of a prior or contemporaneous agreement contradicting
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the clear language of the written guarantees would be, as a matter
of law, inadmissable.

The alleged representation by the plaintiff,

to take an assignment of the real property mortgage, would be
just such an agreement.

The individual defendants as principals

of M-K Investment Company, signed unconditional guarantees in
order to obtain a loan from the plaintiff.

The loan having been

•

made and the defendants having received the benefit of the guarantees,

they now seek to vary the terms of those written guarantees

by alleging they were conditioned on the plaintiff taking an
assignment of the real property mortgage.

Since the parol evidence

rule prevents the individual defendants from proving at trial
that the plaintiff made such a representation,

the issue of

whether the plaintiff made the representation was not an issue
of fact that was material to this lawsuit.
The second purported material issue of fact is whether
the plaintiff made a representation that it would look to its
collateral before looking to the individual guarantors.
the defendants, Paul W.

Again,

Nielsen and William D. Maxwell did not

raise this issue in their pleadings.

J.O. Kingston was the

only defendant to raise this issue, and in his Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, J. O. Kingston stated,
"this answering Defendant does not now recall any specific conversation with any officer of Plaintiff where he was told that
Plaintiff would look first

to the collateral securing the obliga-
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tion."

Again,

the District Court would have erred if it had

denied the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment because of
a purported material issue of fact

that was not properly before

the court.
Additionally,

the parol evidence rule would prevent the

individual defendants from presenting evidence concerning a representation by the plaintiff that it would look first
For the same reasons as discussed above,

collateral.

to its
this

second purported material issue of fact was not a basis for the
District Court to deny the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The third purported material issue of fact concerns the
value of the collateral which the defendants claim the plaintiff
has lost or
lost,

impaire~.

The issue of whether the plaintiff has

impaired or waived any of its collateral is a legal issue

which shall be addressed below.

However, simply stated,

the plaintiff's position that since,
has not lost,

as a matter of law,

impaired or waived any of its collateral,

it is
it
the

factual issue concerning the value of that collateral was not
material to the lawsuit.
The fourth and final purported material issue of fact involves what has happened to the proceeds from the various obligations listed in the Assignment of Monies taken by the plaintiff as security for its loan to M-K Investment Company.

Again,

it is the plaintiff's position that this issue was not material
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to the lawsuit, since,

as explained below,

the plaintiff was

never legally obligated to look to the Assignment of Monies before pursuing the individual guarantors.
A close

analy~is

of each of the purported material issues

of fact raised by the defendants, Paul W. Nielsen and William
D.

Maxwel~

clearly shows that there was no genuine issue as to

any material fact.

POINT II
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK WAS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT IN ITS FAVOR AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The defendants'

final

attack on the Partial Summary

Judgment focuses on the District Court's conclusions of law.
First,

they argue that since the plaintiff did not pursue its

security before pursuing the individual guarantors, it released
the individual guarantors, at least to the extent of the value
of the security.

Clearly, this is not the law in Utah.

In

the recent case of Strevell-Paterson Company, Inc. v. Michael
R.

Francis, No.

17598

(Utah, May 12, 1982), this Court addressed

the same issue and held that where the guarantee in question is
an absolute guarantee of payment, and not a mere guarantee of
collection,

the guaranteed party need not pursue its remedies

against the debtor or the security before proceeding directly
against the guarantor.
The defendants next argue that the plaintiff failed to perfect
its interest in its collateral and by so doing has released,
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surrendered,

impaired or otherwise harmed the collateral,

thus

releasing the individual guarantors to the extent of the value
of the collateral.

It is very important to note that, without

exception, every source of law cited by the defendants in their
brief deals with a situation where the creditor had actually
taken security and then released,
otherwise harmed it.

surrendered,

impaired or

Since the plaintiff never took an assign-

ment of the real property mortgage, and indeed was never obligated
to do so, all of the law cited by the defendants on this point is
inapposite as to the real property mortgage.

The only question

is whether the plaintiff has waived any of the collateral which
it actually did take,

i.e., the Assignment of Monies.

As stated

in the plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Utah Code Annotated 70A-9-501(1) provides:
When a debtor is in default under a security
agreement, a secured
party has the rights
and remedies provided in this part and except as limited by subsection (3) those provided in the security agreement.
He may
reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or
otherwise enforce the security interest by
any available judicial procedure.
If the
collateral is documents the secured party
may proceed either as to the documents or as
to the goods covered thereby.
A secured
party in possession has the rights, remedies
and duties provided in Section 70A-9-207.
The rights and remedies ref erred to in this
subsection are cumulative.
(Emphasis added)
"(T)he intent of the code was to broaden the options open to a
creditor after default rather than to limit them under the old
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theory of election of remedies."
Marston,

29 Mich.

App.

Michigan National Bank v.

99, 185 N.W.2d 47

(1970).

Discussing

the rights of a creditor under Article 9 of the Commercial Code,
an Illinois court stated,

"(A)

creditor is able to pursue any

one of a number of remedies against a debtor until a debt is
satisfied."

Olsen v.

App.2d 365,

371,

Valley National Bank of Aurora, 91 Ill.

234 N.E.2d 547, 550 (1968).

Additionally, the

Washington Supreme Court, citing Professor Gilmore,
"Nothing the secured

stated,

party may do to collect his debt through

the process of law courts will operate to destroy his security
interest ... "
Therefore,

Foster v.

Knutson, 527 P.2d 1108 (Wash. 1974).

the plaintiff did not waive its security by

choosing to pursue the individual guarantors rather than choosing
to foreclose its security interest.

The plaintiff has not lost

its security either for itself or for the benefit of the individual guarantors.
The legal issues raised in the appellants' brief were properly
decided by the District Court and the plaintiff was entitled
to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

Each of the individual defendants has admitted the existence
of an unpaid obligation owing from M-K Investment Company to
the plaintiff.

Furthermore, each individual defendant has admitted
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executing a written guarantee of that unpaid obligation.

The

District Court resolved, as a matter of law, all of the defenses
raised by the individual defendants and appropriately granted
the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
defendants, Paul W.

On appeal,

the

Nielsen and William D. Maxwell claim that

the Partial Summary Judgment was improper due to disputed
material issues of fact and erroneous conclusions of law.
However,

as explained above,

there was no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the plaintiff was entitled to judgment in its
favor as a matter of law.
Zions First National Bank respectfully requests this Court
to affirm the decision of the Third Judicial District Court for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting the Partial Summary
Judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Respectfully submitted,
GREENE,

CALLISTER & NEBEKER

JOHJV H.

ALLEN
p-;orneys for Respondent, Zions
First National Bank
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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